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THE JUDICIAL INDIVIDUALITY OF LORD SUMPTION 
 
 
JAMES LEE 
 
 
Brian: Look, you've got it all wrong! You don't need to follow me; you don't need to 
follow anybody! You've got to think for yourselves! You're all individuals! 
The Crowd: Yes! We're all individuals! 
Brian: You're all different! 
The Crowd: Yes! We are all different! 
Man in the Crowd: I'm not. 
The Crowd: Ssssssh! 
Monty Python’s Life of Brian1 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This article offers a perspective from the United Kingdom (‘UK’) on the position of 
an individual judge, in order to illuminate the dynamics of judging on a final court of 
appeal. My aim is to examine the jurisprudence of Lord Sumption, a Justice of the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court (‘UKSC’). We shall see that, on precedent, Lord 
Sumption JSC’s view is essentially a conservative one, which perhaps ties into his 
Lordship’s views on judicial self-restraint more broadly. By ‘conservative’ in this 
context, I mean cautious about change, rather than any grander political claim. 
Professor Alan Paterson, in his seminal book Final Judgment, observed that, after two 
years on the Court, ‘Lord Sumption … in some respects [had] begun to take on the 
mantle of Lord Hoffmann for his speed of thought and writing and the clarity of his 
vision’.2 His Lordship has certainly gone on to cement his reputation as a considerable 
intellectual force and personality on the Court. 
 
In order to keep within the confines of one article, I do not intend to survey every one 
of the UKSC decisions to which Lord Sumption has contributed as a Justice. Rather, I 
shall mainly focus on appeals from the most recent full year of UKSC decisions: 
                                                 
  Senior Lecturer in Private Law, The Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College London, and 
Associate Academic Fellow of the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple. Aspects of the 
themes developed in this paper have been presented variously at the Cambridge Private Law 
Centre, the Obligations VII Conference at the University of Hong Kong, the University of 
Edinburgh and the University of New South Wales. I gratefully acknowledge the support of a 
Professor Sir Neil MacCormick, Visiting Fellowship at the University of Edinburgh. In addition 
to all who attended those presentations, I especially thank Gabrielle Appleby, Andrew Burrows, 
Paul Daly, Brice Dickson, Rosalind Dixon, Matthew Dyson, Mark Elliott, Simon Lee, Andrew 
Lynch, William Lucy, David Mead, Alan Paterson, Lindsay Stirton, Graham Virgo, Man Yip 
and George Williams for helpful comments on aspects of the project. Finally, I record my 
sincere gratitude to Zoe Graus, the Editorial Board, and to the anonymous reviewers of this 
article. All views, and any errors, are my own.  
1  Directed by Terry Jones, HandMade Films, 1979. 
2  Alan Paterson, Final Judgment: The Last Law Lords and the Supreme Court (Hart Publishing, 
2013) 205. For studies on Lord Hoffmann’s approach to judging, see Paul S Davies and Justine 
Pila (eds), The Jurisprudence of Lord Hoffmann: A Festschrift in Honour of Lord Leonard 
Hoffmann (Hart Publishing, 2015); James Lee, ‘Fidelity in Interpretation: Lord Hoffmann and 
the Adventure of the Empty House’ (2008) 28 Legal Studies 1. 
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2015–16,3 which was the Court’s seventh full year. Considering decisions in which 
Lord Sumption has delivered the lead, concurring or dissenting judgment, I shall take 
two private law decisions as case studies.4 This is in part because a recent collection 
has examined the implications of Lord Sumption’s extra-curial5 views on judging 
from a public law perspective,6 but also because Lord Sumption’s judicial 
contributions in 2015–16 mainly covered other areas.7 My focus will thus be upon 
two areas – the law of illegality, and the tort of malicious prosecution – on which 
Lord Sumption has already had the opportunity to judge more than once in his 
relatively short judicial career. We shall see that his Lordship’s views have avowedly 
not changed on the relevant issues. In developing my analysis, I shall also identify 
some broader themes related to the business of judging in the UK’s apex court. 
 
The aforementioned book of essays contains a response from Lord Sumption, in 
which his Lordship has said that ‘there is no point comparing my lectures with my 
judgments on these issues and finding inconsistencies between them. Of course they 
are inconsistent’.8 That is on the basis that in his judgments he has to have regard to 
what he thinks the law is, whereas in a speech he can say what he really thinks.9 But, 
with respect, I shall show that comparing Lord Sumption’s views in extra-curial 
speeches and judgments does help us to understand his Lordship’s judicial philosophy 
when it comes to precedent, not least because there are some points in which his 
Lordship has used the same language in both. 
 
In an interview with Paterson shortly after Lord Sumption became a Justice, his 
Lordship rejected the idea that there is always a single right answer in every case, and 
said that he takes the view that ‘the object of this Court is to produce a result that is 
coherent in relation to the generality of cases in relation to other cognate areas of 
law’.10 As we shall see below, this stance has clearly informed Lord Sumption’s 
approach to judging, and my main argument is that we see Lord Sumption’s judicial 
                                                 
3  See below Part II.  
4  Patel v Mirza [2016] 3 WLR 399 (‘Patel’), discussed below in Part V(C); Willers v Joyce 
[2016] 3 WLR 477 (‘Willers (No 1)’), discussed below in Part VI. 
5  Here I deliberately use the term ‘extra-curial’ to refer to speeches, since engaging with the 
public and the academy through such lectures is arguably still part of the judicial role.  
6  NW Barber, Richard Ekins and Paul Yowell (eds), Lord Sumption and the Limits of Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2016). Professor Craig’s essay in this collection, ‘Limits of Law: Reflections from 
Private and Public Law’, also adverts to some features of reasoning in private law cases: at 175. 
The collection was prompted by a lecture given by Lord Sumption in 2013: Lord Sumption, 
‘The Limits of Law’ (Speech delivered at the 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur, 20 
November 2013) 15. 
7  Lord Sumption gave the brief judgment referring a question on the operation of Council 
Directive 79/7/EEC on the Progressive Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment for 
Men and Women in Matters of Social Security: MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2016] UKSC 53. The case concerned whether the Directive ‘precludes the imposition in 
national law of a requirement that, in addition to satisfying the physical, social and 
psychological criteria for recognising a change of gender, a person who has changed gender 
must also be unmarried in order to qualify for a state retirement pension’: at [18]. Lord 
Sumption also gave judgment on the powers of the now-abolished Northern Ireland 
Commissioner for Complaints: Re JR55 [2016] UKSC 22. See also Richard Kirkham, ‘JR55, 
Judicial Strategy and the Limits of Textual Reasoning’ (2017) 1 Public Law 46. 
8  Lord Sumption, ‘A Response’ in NW Barber, Richard Ekins and Paul Yowell (eds), Lord 
Sumption and the Limits of Law (Hart Publishing, 2016) 213, 213. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 2, 272. 
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conservatism emerge from these cases. Responsible for giving the highest percentage 
of lead judgments in the UKSC in 2015–16,11 Lord Sumption is a powerful voice on 
the Court and has developed a distinctive style of judging.  
 
 
II UK SUPREME COURT: ADJUDICATIVE STRUCTURES AND 
PRECEDENT 
 
In the context of this special issue, it is worth making some brief points about the 
UKSC’s working practices,12 in order to understand the role of any individual Justice 
of the Court.13 The Court has recently seen a period of stability in membership, with 
no changes between the appointment of Lord Hodge JSC in October 2013 and the 
retirement of Lord Toulson JSC in September 2016. Five more members of the Court 
will retire before the end of 2018, including Lord Sumption, who will reach his 
compulsory age of retirement (70)14 in December of that year. It is thus an opportune 
time to examine the work of the Court, with a focus on one of the Justices who is 
nearing the end of his service. 
 
The UKSC is meant to have the equivalent of 12 full time Justices on the Court,15 but 
it currently has 11. It has been announced16 that the six appointments will be made in 
two rounds of three, in order to encourage a diverse range of applicants and to balance 
the Court’s subject needs.17 Lords Neuberger PSC and Clarke JSC will retire in the 
summer of 2017,18 and so the Court will replace three Justices for the start of the 
2017–18 year. Until then, Lord Toulson, Lord Dyson (who recently retired as Master 
                                                 
11  See Part IV below. 
12  Considered more fully in James Lee, ‘The United Kingdom Supreme Court: A Study in Judicial 
Reform’ in Emmanuel Guinchard and Marie-Pierre Granger (eds), The New EU Judiciary – An 
Analysis of Current Judicial Reforms (Kluwer, forthcoming 2017). See also Paterson, Final 
Judgment, above n 2; Dickson, Human Rights, below n 43. 
13  Unlike some other apex courts, the UKSC does not have a term such as ‘puisne’ or ‘Associate’ 
Justice. The Court has a President and a Deputy President and then s 23(6) of the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 (UK) c 4, provides that ‘[t]he judges other than the President and Deputy 
President are to be styled “Justices of the Supreme Court”’.  
14  Lord Sumption’s belated judicial appointment means that he must retire at 70 because s 26 of 
the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 (UK) c 8 reduced the retirement age from 75 to 
70, for judges first appointed to a relevant judicial post after 31 March 1995. 
15  Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (UK) c 4 s 23(2), as amended by the Crime and Courts Act 
2013 (UK) c 22 s 20, giving effect to sch 13, Pt 2, para 2. There have so far only been a 
maximum of 12 Justices at any one time. 
16  The Supreme Court, Statement on Supreme Court Appointments Process (11 July 2016) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/statement-on-supreme-court-appointments-process.html>. 
Lord Toulson retired on 22 September 2016. The other five Justices will all retire in 2018: Lord 
Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Mance, Lord Hughes and Lord Sumption.  
17  See Jenny Rowe, ‘Chief Executive’s Review of the Process Followed by Selection 
Commissions Making Recommendations for Appointment to The Supreme Court’ (July 2015) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/review-of-selection-commission-process-july-2015.pdf>; 
Lord Neuberger, ‘The Role of the Supreme Court Seven Years On – Lessons Learnt’ (Speech 
delivered at Bar Council Law Reform Lecture 2016, 21 November 2016) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-161121.pdf>.  
18  Lord Neuberger, above n 17, [52]. 
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of the Rolls), and two retired Scottish judges, Lords Gill19 and Hamilton, have served 
on the Supplementary Panel to bolster the Court’s bench where necessary. 
 
The UKSC has seen a marked trend towards single judgments under the Presidency of 
Lord Neuberger, who has ‘been keen to encourage a more collegiate, even a 
collaborative, approach towards judgment-writing’.20 Of the 75 decisions in the 2015–
16 court year, 47 involved a single judgment (62.67 per cent of the total).21 But it 
remains the case that each judge can, if they choose, issue their own opinion. Lord 
Sumption has himself expressed reservations about concurring and dissenting where 
not felt necessary: ‘a judge may dissent or he may concur for different reasons. This 
can be personally satisfying. But it is not much of a service to the public’.22 
Nevertheless there are various instances of Lord Sumption issuing separate opinions, 
whether concurring or dissenting.23 The effect of this is that we can identify themes 
and patterns in the jurisprudence of Lord Sumption as an individual judge on the 
UKSC.  
  
Another relevant feature of the UKSC’s practices is that the Court has had a practice 
of never sitting en banc. This is not least because the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
(UK) c 4, which provided for the creation of the Court, requires it to sit with an 
uneven number of Justices:24 in the event of the usual full complement of 12 serving 
Justices, therefore, it would not be possible to sit en banc. Instead, the vast majority of 
cases – just over 80 per cent – are heard with a panel of five Justices.25 This approach 
means that the Court can hear two cases at once, in parallel panels.26 In particularly 
important cases, or where the Court is being invited to depart from a previous 
decision, the Court may sit in an enlarged panel of seven or nine. There are published 
                                                 
19  Lord Gill reached the statutory retirement age on 25 February 2017: Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, Lord Gill Given Supreme Court Farewell (24 February 2017) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/lord-gill-given-supreme-court-farewell.html>. 
20  Lord Neuberger, above n 17, [40]. 
21  Lee, ‘The United Kingdom Supreme Court: A Study in Judicial Reform’, above n 12. Paterson 
has shown that between 1981 and 2013, the percentage of single judgments varied from 12 per 
cent to 70 per cent: Final Judgment, above n 2, 106. 
22  Lord Sumption, ‘A Response’, above n 8, 213.  
23  See Lord Sumption dissenting in BNY Mellon Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v LBG Capital No 
1 Plc [2016] UKSC 29, [55]: ‘This case is of considerable financial importance to the parties but 
raises no questions of wider legal significance. There is therefore no point in dissenting at any 
length. But since I would have held that that these securities are not redeemable, I should, 
however briefly, explain why’. And in Re B (A child) [2016] UKSC 4, [83]: ‘A dissenting 
judgment is not the place for a detailed examination of the ambit of the inherent jurisdiction’. A 
final example from 2017 is his Lordship’s concurrence in FirstGroup Plc v Paulley [2017] 
UKSC 4, [92], expressing doubts about the outcome but noting that ‘this is not a case in which it 
would be right to dissent. In a situation where there is no ideal solution, but only more or less 
unsatisfactory ones, I think that the approach of Lord Neuberger and Lord Toulson comes as 
close to giving effect to the policy of this legislation as a court legitimately can’. 
24  Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (UK) c 4, s 42(1)(a). 
25  James Lee, ‘Against All Odds: Numbers Sitting in the UK Supreme Court and Really, Really 
Important Cases’ in Paul Daly (ed), Apex Courts and the Common Law (forthcoming 2017). 
26  This can occur whether sitting in the UKSC or as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
(‘JCPC’). Between October 2009 and August 2016, the UKSC decided 479 cases, and in the 
same period there were 287 JCPC decisions: see Lee, ‘The United Kingdom Supreme Court: A 
Study in Judicial Reform’, above n 12, pt 2. 
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criteria for when such an enlarged panel will be convened.27 The court sat for the first 
time ever in a panel of 11 in an appeal relating to the UK’s departure from the 
European Union: R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union.28 
Miller saw extensive attention focused on the UKSC; when judgment was handed 
down, Lord Sumption joined in the judgment attributed to all eight Justices in the 
majority.29  
 
The effect of these arrangements is that, unlike certain other apex courts, any 
individual Justice will not hear all the appeals, and indeed most Justices may not hear 
the majority of cases: indeed, in the 2015–16 year, only Lord Neuberger (the 
President), Lady Hale (the Deputy President) and Lord Toulson JSC sat in a majority 
of the Court’s 75 decisions.30 For his part, Lord Sumption sat in 44 per cent of the 
cases. There are no official criteria for determining the composition of panels, but 
Lord Neuberger has said that the Court seeks to ensure ‘that a panel of five (or more) 
hearing a case includes any Justice with special expertise in the relevant law, and that 
there will also normally be Justices who can bring their more general legal knowledge 
and experience to bear on the case’.31 We shall see that Lord Sumption’s contribution 
spans several areas of the law, and, as demonstrated in the next Part, his Lordship has 
not shown himself to be reticent in bringing his experience to bear within the areas of 
other Justices’ specialisms. 
 
My argument as developed below is that Lord Sumption can be seen as one of the 
more conservative Justices in terms of precedent. But that must be understood within 
the context that the Supreme Court has generally been reasonably conservative as a 
                                                 
27  The Supreme Court, Panel Numbers Criteria <https://www.supremecourt.uk/procedures/panel-
numbers-criteria.html>. I have criticised the application of these criteria: Lee, ‘Against All 
Odds’, above n 25. 
28  [2017] 2 WLR 583 (‘Miller’). The Court’s announcement that all 11 Justices were to sit can be 
found here: The Supreme Court, Article 50 (‘Brexit’) Case (8 November 2016) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/permission-to-appeal-decision-08-november-2016.html>. 
Lord Sumption attracted considerable media attention during the hearing in Miller, not only for 
his incisive interventions but also for his ‘loud’ ties: see, eg, Helena Horton, ‘“Brain of Britain” 
Judge Lord Sumption Dazzles Brexit Hearing with His Loud Ties’, The Daily Telegraph 
(online), 7 December 2016 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/07/judge-lord-sumption-
dazzles-watching-brexit-hearing-loud-ties/>; Jack Sommers, ‘Judge Lord Sumption Becomes 
Star of Supreme Court Brexit Hearing’, The Huffington Post (online), 6 December 2016 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/supreme-court-brexit-hearing-finds-its-star-in-lord-
sumption_uk_5846a82ce4b06a503249176d>; Patrick Kidd, ‘Ties that Blind Make Lord 
Sumption a Brexit Hearing Star’, The Times (online), 10 December 2016 
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ties-that-blind-make-lord-sumption-a-brexit-hearing-star-
rrq7jrn9f >; Haroon Siddique, ‘Supreme Court Brexit Hearing: 10 Things We Learned’ The 
Guardian (online), 9 December 2016 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/08/supreme-court-brexit-10-things-learned-
royal-prerogative-henry-viii>. 
29  The majority comprised Lord Neuberger PSC, Lady Hale DPSC, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord 
Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge JJSC. Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath and 
Lord Hughes JJSC dissented, each delivering an individual opinion: see Sir Stephen Sedley, 
‘The Judges’ Verdicts’, London Review of Books (online), 30 January 2017 
<https://www.lrb.co.uk/2017/01/30/stephen-sedley/the-judges-verdicts>. 
30  The next highest percentage was that of Lord Reed, who sat on 49.3 per cent of the appeals. 
This is based on the author’s own empirical analysis of the 2015–16 decisions of the Supreme 
Court, using the same dataset as for Part IV below. Justices of the Supreme Court also have a 
significant workload serving in the Privy Council: see above n 26. 
31  Lord Neuberger, above n 17, [24]. 
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whole.32 The UKSC has maintained a practice of continuity in terms of precedent 
from its predecessor the House of Lords, which exercised its power to depart from its 
own decisions (recognised in the 1966 Practice Statement)33 only rarely. In Rees v 
Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust,34 the House of Lords declined an invitation 
to depart from the decision in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board,35 which had held 
that it was not possible to claim for the costs of raising a healthy child born after the 
couple had been negligently advised that a vasectomy operation had been successful. 
Lord Bingham stated that: 
 
it would be wholly contrary to the practice of the House to disturb its unanimous 
decision in McFarlane given as recently as 4 years ago, even if a differently constituted 
committee were to conclude that a different solution should have been adopted. It 
would reflect no credit on the administration of the law if a line of English authority 
were to be disapproved in 1999 and reinstated in 2003 with no reason for the change 
beyond a change in the balance of judicial opinion.36 
 
Similar dicta can be found in other House of Lords decisions,37 and the Justices have 
confirmed that the Practice Statement, and the practice in respect of the Practice 
Statement, are ‘part of the established jurisprudence relating to the conduct of 
appeals’, and continue to apply in the UKSC.38 Even on the occasions where the 
Court has decided to depart from a previous authority, the Court has reaffirmed its 
general commitment to caution: ‘This Court should be very circumspect before 
accepting an invitation to invoke the 1966 Practice Statement’.39 
 
III LORD SUMPTION’S HISTORY 
 
Lord Sumption presents an interesting case study, especially since the Court’s 
membership has been relatively stable since 2013: ‘Inevitably, as people change the 
character of the institution changes too’.40 He was a History Fellow at Magdalen 
College Oxford before going to the Bar and is the author of a multi-volume history of 
                                                 
32  Lee, ‘The United Kingdom Supreme Court: A Study in Judicial Reform’, above n 12, pt 2. For 
more detail, see James Lee, ‘Fides et Ratio: Precedent in the Early Jurisprudence of the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court’ (2015) 21(1) European Journal of Current Legal Issues 
<http://webjcli.org/article/view/410/521>; Sir Louis Blom-Cooper and Gavin Drewry, 
‘Correcting Wrong Turns: The 50th Birthday of the 1966 House of Lords Practice Statement on 
Precedent’ (2016) 3 Public Law 381. 
33  Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234 (‘Practice Statement’). 
34  [2004] 1 AC 309. 
35  [2000] 2 AC 59. 
36  Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309, [7]. 
37  Fitzleet Estates Ltd v Cherry [1977] 1 WLR 1345, 1349 (Lord Wilberforce); Horton v Sadler 
[2007] 1 AC 307, 323 [29] (Lord Bingham): ‘It has never been thought enough to justify doing 
so that a later generation of Law Lords would have resolved an issue or formulated a principle 
differently from their predecessors’. 
38  Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark [2011] 1 AC 355, 369 
[24]–[25] (Lord Hope DPSC). The point is now incorporated into the Court’s Practice 
Directions: The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Practice Direction No 4 – Notice of 
Appeal, [4.2.4]. 
39  Knauer v Ministry of Justice [2016] AC 908, 921 [23] (Lord Neuberger PSC and Lady Hale 
DPSC). 
40  Lord Hope, ‘Foreword’ in Paterson, Final Judgement, above n 2  vii. 
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the Hundred Years War.41 Jonathan Sumption QC was sworn in as a Justice of the 
Supreme Court on 11 January 2012.42 He was the first candidate to be appointed to 
the top court (whether the House of Lords or Supreme Court) directly from the Bar 
since Lord Radcliffe in 1949.43 He did have some judicial experience,44 as a Deputy 
High Court Judge45 and Recorder in England, and as an appellate judge in Jersey and 
Guernsey. His first reported High Court judgment, which was an agricultural holdings 
case involving a man whose daffodils were ‘a spectacular sight’,46 even has, dare one 
say it, a touch of Lord Denning in its introduction.47 In fact, Lord Sumption told the 
Denning Society of an encounter with Lord Denning at Magdalen.48 Jonathan 
Sumption QC’s second reported judgment begins simply: ‘this is a sad story of good 
intentions and subsequent recriminations’.49 Similarly, the opening line of one of his 
first (partial) dissents in the UKSC, on remuneration of a well-paid bank employee, 
was ‘Mr Geys is a lucky man’.50 Lord Sumption has thus taken naturally to the 
                                                 
41  In a profile in The Guardian, Marcel Berlins described Jonathan Sumption as ‘unique [because] 
there is no other top barrister practising today who is pre-eminent in another, unconnected 
field’: Marcel Berlins, ‘The Juggling Barristers’, The Guardian (online), 1 November 1999 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/nov/01/law.theguardian3>. In the rest of this Part, 
we shall see that Lord Sumption would regard his eminence as an historian to be connected to 
his aptitude in law. 
42  The Supreme Court, Jonathan Sumption QC to Be Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice (10 
January 2012) <http://supremecourt.uk/news/jonathan-sumption-qc-to-be-sworn-in-as-supreme-
court-justice.html>. 
43  Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford University 
Press, 2013) 385. This is not the place to dwell on the controversy which Lord Sumption’s 
appointment provoked over concerns about ‘queue-jumping’, or his Lordship’s prior 
membership of the Judicial Appointments Commission, but for a taste of the debate, see Suzi 
Ring, ‘Has Sumption Jumped the Queue or Is He Simply the Best Man for the Job’, LegalWeek 
(online), 11 May 2011 <http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/news/2070230/sumption-
jumped-queue-simply-job>; Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 2, 212. See also Martin 
Loughlin, ‘Sumption’s Assumptions’ in NW Barber, Richard Ekins and Paul Yowell (eds), Lord 
Sumption and the Limits of Law (Hart Publishing, 2016) 27, 28–9, 41. 
44 Joshua Rozenberg highlighted that, in the circumstances of Lord Sumption’s appointment, we 
did not know as much about the newest Justice’s approach to judging as we otherwise might 
have: Joshua Rozenberg, ‘Jonathan Sumption Shows a Certain Naivety’, The Guardian (online), 
9 November 2011 <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/nov/09/sumption-shows-certain-
naivety>. 
45  Two examples of his early cases which have endured are Tsikata v Newspaper Publishing Plc 
[1997] 1 All ER 655 and Marshall v NM Financial Management Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1461. 
46  Brown v Tiernan (1993) 65 P & CR 324, 326. 
47  Ibid 325: 
 Sir Douglas Howard, a retired diplomat, lived for many years at Clophill House, Clophill in 
Bedfordshire until he died on Boxing Day 1987. Sir Douglas’ property included in addition to the 
house and its garden a paddock of just under two acres, which lay beyond the garden separated 
from it by an iron grille and railings. Mr. Colin Brown is a local farmer. He claims that in the 
spring of 1973 Sir Douglas let the paddock to him from year to year for keeping livestock and that 
he thereby became the tenant of an agricultural holding for the purposes of the Agricultural 
Holdings Act 1986. The question in this action is whether he is right. 
48 ‘One day we had an argument about some case that he had just decided, which had hit the front 
pages. I told him that I planned one day to go to the bar. He said: “A big mistake. Stick to 
history.” I didn’t take his advice’: Lord Sumption, ‘The Disunited Kingdom: England, Ireland 
and Scotland’ (2014) 3(1) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 139, 139. 
That lecture is a careful study of the historical relationship between the nations within the 
British Isles. 
49  Crowden v Aldridge [1993] 1 WLR 433, 435.  
50  Geys v Société Générale, London Branch [2013] 1 AC 523, 563 [108]. 
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judicial art of drawing the reader into the narrative:51 ‘one should not under-estimate 
the importance of entertainment as a tool of advocacy or the poetic element in any 
well-written judgment’.52 One can even find allusions to Shakespeare in Lord 
Sumption’s judgments: in the 2017 case of Belhaj v Straw,53 his Lordship, referring to 
the work of Dr FA Mann, said ‘[t]he proposition which the High Court of Australia 
accepted from Dr Mann is tantamount to the abolition of the foreign act of state 
doctrine. This was indeed a consummation devoutly wished by that great scholar’.54 
 
Lord Sumption has also frequently mentioned the influence of his background as an 
historian on his own judicial method: ‘I have no doubt that the grasp of the dynamic 
of human societies through their history makes a better judge. More generally, I 
would say that it improves the quality of almost every kind of decision-making’.55  
 
There is a clear tension, as I have argued elsewhere,56 between judicial individuality 
and the trend towards single (majority) judgments:57 ‘the possibility of judges 
bringing their own perspective to bear [is] greatly reduced if a judgment [requires] the 
agreement of a majority of the court’.58 
 
As a result of the context of his appointment,59 Lord Sumption is in the unusual 
position of having appeared regularly before many of his colleagues, as counsel in 
two of the final decisions of the House of Lords60 and in five cases decided by the 
UKSC between 2009 and 2011, including probably the most famous decision of the 
Court’s first term, Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc (‘Bank Charges 
                                                 
51  Simon Lee, ‘Lord Denning and Margaret Thatcher, Law and Society’ (2013) 25 Denning Law 
Journal 159, 164. 
52  Lord Sumption, ‘The Historian as Judge’ (Speech delivered at training session for upper tribunal 
judges, The Rolls Building, 6 October 2016) 5 <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
161006.pdf>. 
53  [2017] UKSC 3. 
54  Ibid [247]. ‘‘Tis a consummation devoutly to be wished’ is a line from Hamlet’s ‘To be or not to 
be’ soliloquy: William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Scene I. 
55  Lord Sumption, ‘The Historian as Judge’, above n 52, 9. 
56  James Lee, ‘A Defence of Concurring Speeches’ [2009] Public Law 305. 
57  See also Lady Hale, ‘Judgment Writing in the Supreme Court’ (Speech delivered at The 
Supreme Court First Anniversary Seminar, 30 September 2010) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech_100930.pdf>.  
58  Lee, ‘A Defence of Concurring Speeches’, above n 56, 331. 
59  Lord Wilberforce was the last Law Lord to be appointed direct from the High Court. 
60  Lexington Insurance Co v AGF Insurance Ltd [2010] 1 AC 180; Stone & Rolls Ltd (in liq) v 
Moore Stephens (a firm) [2009] 1 AC 1391. 
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Case’).61 Not only that, Lord Sumption was also widely regarded as amongst the 
outstanding counsel of the day,62 and is currently the seventh most senior Justice.63  
 
At the time of writing, there are 12 speeches by Lord Sumption published on the 
UKSC website;64 we may also add his FA Mann Lecture,65 delivered shortly before 
his appointment to the Court. Reference is made to those speeches at appropriate 
points below, but they cover a range of topics, from specific areas of public or private 
law. Lord Sumption has particularly deprecated the idea of specialisation, amongst 
both students and practising lawyers.66 In a recent speech entitled ‘Family Law at a 
Distance’, Lord Sumption confessed that he had ‘always taken the view that legal 
specialisations are essentially bogus. At the bar, I liked to trespass on other people’s 
cabbage patches. As a judge I do it most of the time’.67 His Lordship added that he 
does ‘not regard law as comprising distinct bundles of rules, one for each area of 
human affairs. This is partly because no area of law is completely self-contained’.68  
 
An example of Lord Sumption’s disinclination to defer to certain specialisms is 
shown by his dissent in Re B (A child),69 in which his Lordship declined to defer to 
the view of Lord Wilson, one of the Court’s family law experts, and dissented along 
with Lord Clarke. Lord Wilson’s lead judgment suggested that Lord Sumption 
‘misunderstands my judgment’70 and had ‘inadvertently … been too selective’.71 Lord 
Sumption has also elsewhere noted his work as counsel in two cases on illegality 
                                                 
61  [2010] 1 AC 696 (albeit that the argument in the case took place in the House of Lords). The 
other four cases were: Norris v Government of the United States of America [No 2] [2010] 2 AC 
487; NML Capital Ltd v Argentina [2011] 2 AC 495; Risk Management Partners Ltd v Brent 
London Borough Council [2011] 2 AC 34; Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2012] 1 AC 208. In that 
final case, which concerned Star Wars stormtrooper helmets, one finds a taste of the nature of 
Sumptionian advocacy in the judgment of Lords Walker and Collins: at 226: 
 In this Court the claimants have challenged the reasoning of the judge and the Court of Appeal. Mr 
Sumption QC said that it was eccentric of the judge to describe the helmet’s purpose as utilitarian, 
and that the Court of Appeal could find it to have a functional purpose only by treating it as having 
the same functional purpose as a real helmet ‘within the confines of a film’. This is quite a puzzling 
point. 
62  ‘David Pannick QC and Jonathan Sumption QC were repeatedly identified by the Law Lords I 
interviewed as at the top of the profession, but their styles are quite different’: Alan Paterson, 
‘Does Advocacy Matter in the Lords?’ in James Lee (ed), From House of Lords to Supreme 
Court: Judges, Jurists and the Process of Judging (Hart Publishing, 2011) 255, 264. 
63  Lord Sumption’s appointment was announced on the same day as that of Lord Wilson, but Lord 
Sumption’s swearing in was delayed. 
64  The Supreme Court, Speeches (2017) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/speeches.html>.  
65  Jonathan Sumption, ‘Judicial and Political Decision-Making: The Uncertain Boundary’ (2011) 
16 Judicial Review 301. Joshua Rozenberg described the lecture as showing ‘a certain naivety’: 
above n 44. See also Sir Stephen Sedley, ‘Judicial Politics’ (2012) 34(4) London Review of 
Books 15, 15–16.  
66  Lord Sumption, ‘The Historian as Judge’, above n 52, 9–10. 
67  Lord Sumption, ‘Family Law at a Distance’ (Speech delivered at the At a Glance Conference, 
Royal College of Surgeons, 8 June 2016) 1; cf Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 2, 90.  
68  Lord Sumption, ‘Family Law at a Distance’, above n 67, 2. Lord Sumption is not alone in 
recognising the values of generalist expertise: see Chief Justice Robert French, ‘“In Praise of 
Breadth” – A Reflection on the Virtues of Generalist Lawyering’ (Paper presented at Law 
Summer School, University of Western Australia, 20 February 2009) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-
justices/frenchcj/frenchcj20feb09.pdf>.  
69  [2016] UKSC 4. 
70  Ibid 20 [54]. 
71  Ibid 20 [55]. 
 10 
 
included ‘a victory which earned me the undying resentment of company lawyers, and 
… another case in which the defence was upheld to the horror of all sound 
competition lawyers’.72 Nor is his Lordship alone in recognising the value of 
generalist expertise: the recently retired Chief Justice of Australia, Robert French, has 
argued that ‘it is necessary … to make sure that neither the profession nor the courts 
evolve into a kind of archipelago of islands of expertise separated by a sea of 
unknowing’.73 
 
IV STATISTICS 
 
One might think that Lord Sumption has especial cause to reflect on the nature of 
judging in the Court, having acted on both sides of the bench much more recently than 
his colleagues.74 Lord Sumption has certainly made a considerable impact during his 
short tenure: Paterson recorded that Lord Sumption had delivered the third highest 
percentage of lead and single judgments as a percentage of total cases during the first 
four years of the Court, and his position was the same if dissents were included, at just 
under 30 per cent.75 The only judges at that point to have delivered a higher 
percentage of judgments were Lords Phillips and Hope, who were respectively 
President and Deputy President for most of the period and therefore assumed a higher 
burden of judgment-writing duties (a trend continued by Lord Neuberger and Lady 
Hale, as detailed below).76  
 
The graphs below are based on an analysis of the UKSC decisions in the 2015–16 
year.77 The UKSC sits in legal years generally commencing in October and ending in 
late July (the Court’s medium neutral citations follow the calendar year). The Court 
has very rarely delivered judgments in August78 and September.79 The Court was 
inaugurated on 1 October 2009 and is currently in its eighth year of decisions. The 
significance of the legal year for the Court is illustrated by the appointment of 
Presidents to sit from the start of a given year (Lord Neuberger succeeded Lord 
Phillips in October 2012, and Lord Neuberger will himself retire in the summer of 
2017). 
 
In 2015–16, we see that Lord Sumption’s early contributions, as identified by 
Paterson,80 are consistent with his subsequent performance,81 with him ranking 
                                                 
72  Lord Sumption, ‘Reflections on the Law of Illegality’ (2012) 20 Restitution Law Review 1, 1. 
The two cases were respectively Stone & Rolls Ltd (in liq) v Moore Stephens (a firm) [2009] 1 
AC 1391 and Safeway Stores Ltd v Twigger [2011] 2 All ER 841. 
73  Chief Justice French, above n 68, 18.  
74  Indeed, Lord Sumption was the only person interviewed by Professor Paterson as both counsel 
and a Justice: Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 2, 5 n 22. 
75  Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 2, 161. 
76  For further information on the burdens of the two senior Justices, see ibid 71, 86–97. 
77  Lords Thomas LCJ, Lord Dyson MR and Lord Gill (a former Lord President from Scotland) are 
not permanent members of the UKSC but serve as ad hoc judges: see text accompanying above 
n 20. 
78  The only occasions on which the Court has done so are SerVaas Incorporated v Rafidian Bank 
[2013] 1 AC 595; Moreno v The Motor Insurers’ Bureau [2016] 1 WLR 3194. 
79  The only occasions on which it has done so are A v A (Children: Habitual Residence) [2014] 
AC 1; Robertson v Swift [2014] 1 WLR 3438; Marley v Rawlings [2015] AC 157. 
80 Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 2, 205 (as quoted in the accompanying text to above n 2 ). 
81  For further details of the Supreme Court’s statistics in the period since Paterson’s study, see the 
annual reviews (by calendar year) by Professor Brice Dickson in The New Law Journal: Brice 
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amongst the ‘most prolific’ judgment writers on the court.82 Indeed, his Lordship 
delivered the highest percentage of lead (or joint lead) judgments in those cases in 
which he sat (30.3 per cent, ahead of Lord Neuberger on 29 per cent): 
 
 
 
Lord Sumption is also in the top three Justices in terms of dissent percentage in that 
same most recent full court year. It should be noted that there is an asterisk next to the 
names of Lords Mance, Clarke and Sumption, because of the decision in Patel:83 that 
case saw the Justices unanimous as to the outcome, but vehemently disagreed as to the 
applicable principles. I am therefore not counting the judgments in that case as 
dissents. It is fully considered below.84 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Dickson, ‘A Supreme Education’ (2014) 164 New Law Journal 17; Brice Dickson, ‘A Steady 
Ship’ (2015) 165 New Law Journal 26; Brice Dickson, ‘Reigning Supreme’ 166 New Law 
Journal 19; Brice Dickson, ‘Supreme Justice’ (2017) 167 New Law Journal 20. 
82  Dickson, ‘Supreme Justice’, above n 81, 20. 
83  [2016] 3 WLR 399. 
84  See Part V below. 
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These statistics certainly point to a significant work ethic, but also intellectual 
influence in engaging with colleagues. As an example of dialogues amongst the 
Justices, Paterson recounts that in the case of Oracle,85 Lord Sumption’s draft dissent 
eventually, after circulation and revision, became the single judgment for the Court.86  
 
Where Lord Sumption has dissented, he has done so with gusto, often delving into the 
historical background to legal principles,87 which is fitting for an accomplished 
historian. His judgment style involves short, punchy sentences and a strident tone. His 
partial dissent in R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice88 begins in striking fashion: 
 
English judges tend to avoid addressing the moral foundations of law. It is not their 
function to lay down principles of morality, and the attempt leads to large 
generalisations which are commonly thought to be unhelpful. In some cases, however, 
it is unavoidable. This is one of them.89 
 
Elsewhere, I have described his judgment in Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria90 as 
‘characteristically trenchant’,91 and one can observe patterns of the majorities and 
minorities amongst the Justices, as we shall see in the case studies which follow. It is 
worth noting, in respect of individual judging, that, on the three occasions on which 
Lord Sumption dissented in 2015–16, his Lordship was not the sole dissentient.92 This 
                                                 
85  Oracle America Inc (Formerly Sun Microsystems Inc) v M-Tech Data Ltd [2012] 1 WLR 2012 
(‘Oracle’). 
86  Paterson, Final Judgment, above n 2, 205. 
87  See, eg, Geys v Société Générale, London Branch [2013] 1 AC 523. 
88  [2015] AC 657 (‘Nicklinson’). 
89  Ibid 824 [207]. 
90  [2014] AC 1189. 
91  James Lee, ‘Constructing and Limiting Liability in Equity’ (2015) 131 Law Quarterly Review 
39, 40. 
92  Re B (A child) [2016] UKSC 4 (Lord Clarke also dissenting); Willers v Joyce [No 1] [2016] 3 
WLR 477 (Lords Neuberger, Mance and Reed also dissenting); BNY Mellon Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd v LBG Capital No 1 plc [2016] 1 All ER 497 (Lord Clarke also dissenting). 
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demonstrates an ability to bring colleagues with him, and to persuade them as to the 
merits of an alternative argument. Indeed, 2015–16 may mark the peak of his 
Lordship’s ascendancy in terms of contribution to the Court:93 as we shall see in the 
next section, that court year culminated in two key cases which reveal insights into his 
Lordship’s jurisprudence. 
 
V ILLEGALITY 
 
A The Defence 
 
The defence of illegality has recently been the subject of extensive disagreement in 
the UKSC:94 beyond Lord Mansfield’s dictum ‘no court will lend its aid to a man who 
founds his cause of action on an immoral or an illegal act’,95 it has not been clear how 
the defence is to operate. Over a series of four cases in the space of just two years, the 
Court has seen what Lord Sumption has labelled a ‘judicial schism’.96 Lord Sumption 
has played a significant role in three of the four cases, and indeed the law on illegality 
was the subject of his Lordship’s first extra-curial speech after his appointment to the 
Court.97 His Lordship has characterised the schism as being between ‘those judges 
and writers who regard the law of illegality as calling for the application of clear 
rules, and those who would wish to address the equities of each case as it arises’.98 
From the framing of that issue, one would not be surprised to learn that Lord 
Sumption is in the former camp, let alone that it confirms his Lordship’s preference 
for clarity and certainty in adjudication.  
 
In his Chancery Bar Association (‘CBA’) lecture on illegality, Lord Sumption argued 
that 
 
the law of illegality is an area in which there are few propositions, however contradictory or 
counter-intuitive, that cannot be supported by respectable authorities at the highest levels. For as 
long as I can remember, the English courts have been endeavouring to rationalise it.
99  
 
The lecture displays dissatisfaction with the arbitrary technicality of the law, as 
typified by the approach of the House of Lords in Tinsley v Milligan,100 which held 
that the test in cases of illegality was whether the claimant ‘was required by the nature 
of his or her case to rely on his illegal acts’.101 His Lordship viewed cases like Tinsley 
as resorting to devices to avoid the seemingly harsh application of the principles in the 
                                                 
93  At the time of submission of this article in March 2017, Lord Sumption has issued lead 
judgments in 2 out of 11 cases on which he has sat in the 2016–17 court year, has separately 
concurred in a further 4 cases, and has yet to dissent. The caveat is that these figures are interim 
and incomplete, and also distorted by the short notice interruption of the Court’s docket by the 
hearing of the seminal case of Miller [2017] 2 WLR 583. 
94  For background, see James Lee, ‘The Etiquette of Law Reform’ in Matthew Dyson, James Lee 
and Shona Wilson Stark (eds) in Fifty Years of the Law Commissions – The Dynamics of Law 
Reform (Hart Publishing, 2016) 274, 286–92; R A Buckley, ‘Illegality in the Supreme Court’ 
(2015) 131 Law Quarterly Review 341. 
95  Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341, 343; 98 ER 1120, 1121 (Lord Mansfield). 
96  Patel [2016] 3 WLR 399, 471 [256]. 
97  Lord Sumption, ‘Reflections on the Law of Illegality’, above n 72. 
98  Patel [2016] 3 WLR 399, 459 [226]. 
99  Lord Sumption, ‘Reflections on the Law of Illegality’, above n 72, 1. 
100  [1994] 1 AC 340 (‘Tinsley’). 
101  Lord Sumption, ‘Reflections on the Law of Illegality’, above n 72, 4. 
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cases,102 while also noting his involvement as counsel in two key appellate cases on 
the defence.103 Finally, his Lordship welcomed the Law Commission’s 
recommendations on the topic,104 although he lamented that the Commission had 
pulled back from proposing wider scale reform: ‘like the Grand Old Duke of York, 
[the Commission project across four papers] marched its men to the top of the hill and 
then marched them down again’.105 Instead: 
 
[The] only way in which the complexity, capriciousness and injustice of the current 
English law can be addressed is by making the consequences of a finding that a claim is 
founded on the Claimant’s illegal act subject to a large element of judicial discretion. 
That is why I regret the decision of the Law Commission to abandon its original 
proposal to confer such a discretion on the court by statute.106 
 
The counter-argument that the courts were more open about the application of the 
relevant principles was ‘all very well … but, if the principle is an unattractive one, its 
lucid demonstration is a mixed blessing at best’.107 We shall see that Lord Sumption’s 
development of the law of illegality on the bench contrasts somewhat with his initial 
vision. Before turning to the key decision in Patel,108 a brief sketch of three previous 
UKSC cases is necessary. 
 
B The Previous Trilogy 
 
The first case on illegality to reach the UKSC after Lord Sumption’s appointment109 
was Hounga v Allen,110 a case in which his Lordship did not sit on the panel. The 
claimant had been dismissed from her employment as an au pair and sought to bring a 
claim in respect of unlawful discrimination. With her knowing participation, she had 
been trafficked to the UK from Nigeria by the defendant’s family. It was therefore 
necessary to decide whether the claimant could bring her discrimination claim even 
though she had been involved in the illegal contract at the start of the story. The Court 
held that the claim should succeed. Lord Wilson gave the leading speech and noted 
that there is a ‘subjectivity inherent in the requisite value judgement’.111 Lord Hughes’ 
concurring speech suggested that the focus should be ‘on the position of the claimant 
vis-à-vis the court from which she seeks relief’,112 and that the claim should fail if 
there is a close connection between the illegality and the civil claim.113 
 
                                                 
102  Ibid 2. 
103  Ibid 1. 
104  The Law Commission (UK), The Illegality Defence, Report No 320 (2010).  
105  Lord Sumption, ‘Reflections on the Law of Illegality’, above n 72, 8–9. 
106  Ibid 12. 
107  Ibid. 
108  [2016] 3 WLR 399 . 
109  Lord Sumption acted as counsel in Safeway Stores v Twigger [2011] 2 All ER 841, a case for 
which permission to appeal to the UKSC was refused in April 2011: Supreme Court, 
Applications for Permission to Appeal – Results April 2011 (April 2011) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/PTA-1104_v2.pdf>. 
110  [2014] 1 WLR 2889 (‘Hounga’). 
111  Ibid 2902 [38]. 
112  Ibid 2907 [56]. 
113  Ibid 2908 [57] 
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Lord Sumption gave the lead judgment in Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc,114 
which concerned the applicability of the ex turpi causa defence where the illegality 
was the infringement of a foreign patent. As noted, the Law Commission had rowed 
back from proposing the introduction of a statutory discretion in favour of the flexible 
development of the law by the courts, which had been endorsed by the Court of 
Appeal in the instant case.115 Lord Sumption disavowed such an approach: ‘It makes 
the law uncertain, by inviting the courts to depart from existing rules of law in 
circumstances where it is difficult for them to acknowledge openly what they are 
doing or to substitute a coherent alternative structure’.116 Lord Sumption did not refer 
to his published CBA lecture in his judgment (although he relies on the some of the 
relevant same authorities and makes similar points in both), nor did his Lordship 
mention the decision in Hounga at all. Lord Mance joined in this disapproval of the 
more flexible approach. Lord Toulson issued a separate concurrence, noting that the 
appellants were attempting ‘to extend the doctrine of illegality beyond any previously 
reported decision in circumstances where I see no good public policy reason to do 
so’.117 Lord Toulson did engage with Hounga, and regarded the Court of Appeal’s 
approach as consistent with Hounga.  
 
The difficulty is that the approaches of the leading judgments in each case are 
incompatible: Hounga favours flexibility, while Apotex favours clear rules. In 2015, a 
seven Justice panel of the UKSC was convened to hear Bilta (UK) (in liq) v Nazir [No 
2]:118 the case invited the court to consider the illegality defence and also when the 
conduct of fraudulent company directors can be attributed to the company itself. The 
Justices were unanimous that the illegality defence did not apply on the facts, but their 
reasoning diverged: on attribution, the court also confined the scope of the House of 
Lords decision in Stone & Rolls Ltd (in liq) v Moore Stephens (a firm).119 Lord Mance 
noted that Lord Sumption’s views on the operation of the illegality defence in cases of 
attribution ‘lies in a concession by counsel (Mr Jonathan Sumption QC), no doubt 
tactically well-judged, in Stone & Rolls’.120 A majority of the Justices decided that the 
full breadth of the illegality defence, and resolving the tension between Hounga and 
Apotex, would have to await ‘another day’,121 and another case, preferably ‘as soon as 
appropriately possible’.122 As Lord Neuberger would later recognise in Patel, the 
diversity of approach in the recent UKSC decisions had ‘left the law on the topic in 
some disarray’.123 
 
C Patel v Mirza 
 
                                                 
114  [2015] AC 430 (‘Apotex’). 
115  Etherton LJ (as he then was, a former Chairman of the Law Commission during its project on 
illegality) had said that the defence required ‘an intense analysis of the particular facts and of the 
proper application of the various policy considerations underlying the illegality principle so as 
to produce a just and proportionate response to the illegality’: Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex 
Inc [2013] Bus LR 80, 100 [75]. 
116  Apotex [2015] AC 430, 444 [20]. 
117  Ibid 451 [46]. 
118  [2016] AC 1 (‘Bilta’). 
119  [2009] 1 AC 1391. 
120  Bilta [2016] AC 1, 21 [48]. 
121  Ibid 22 [52] (Lord Mance JSC). 
122  Ibid 12 [15] (Lord Neuberger PSC). 
123  Patel [2016] 3 WLR 399, 444 [164]. 
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Matters thus culminated in Patel.124 The claimant Mr Patel paid Mr Mirza £620 000 
pursuant to a contract under which Mr Mirza was to trade in shares in the Royal Bank 
of Scotland. The intention was to rely on insider information which Mr Mirza 
expected to obtain from contacts at the Bank relating to a government announcement 
that would have an effect on the price of shares. This purported contract between Mr 
Patel and Mr Mirza was a conspiracy to commit an offence of insider dealing.125 No 
government announcement was forthcoming, and so no bets on the share price were 
placed. Mr Patel sought the return of the money under the law of unjust enrichment. 
The nine Justices were unanimous that he was able to recover the money, albeit that 
the Court was far from univocal. 
 
1 Majority Judgments 
 
Lord Toulson gave the lead judgment for the majority,126 holding that the ‘essential 
rationale of the illegality doctrine is that it would be contrary to the public interest to 
enforce a claim if to do so would be harmful to the integrity of the legal system’.127 
Lord Toulson determined that the correct approach to the defence is that judges 
should take into account the underlying purpose of the relevant law which has been 
broken, public policy as engaged by the case and finally the proportionality of 
denying the claim given the illegality in question.128 This is a conscious and confident 
adoption of the approach which Lord Sumption would characterise as addressing the 
equities of the particular case. The Court departed from the House of Lords decision 
in Tinsley. Departing from a previous decision, said Lord Toulson, 
 
is never a step taken lightly. In departing from [Tinsley] it is material that it has been 
widely criticised; that people cannot be said to have entered into lawful transactions in 
reliance on the law as then stated; and, most fundamentally, that the criticisms are well 
founded.129  
 
In response to criticism (not least from Lord Sumption), that this approach would 
leave the law uncertain, Lord Toulson pointed out that the current law was 
‘doctrinally … riven with uncertainties’,130 that the similarly flexible approach in 
other jurisdictions had not engendered serious problems,131 and that people 
contemplating unlawful activities are not entitled to the same protection of certainty 
as to the consequences of their behaviour.132 It was also relevant for Lord Toulson, a 
former Chairman of the Law Commission, that ‘[r]ealistically the prospect of 
legislation can be ignored’,133 as the government had said that the limited reform 
                                                 
124  Ibid. For critical commentary, see James Goudkamp, ‘The End of an Era? Illegality in Private 
Law in the Supreme Court’ (2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 14. See also Chitty on Contracts: 
1st Supplement to 32nd ed (Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) [16-014A]–[16-014L].  
125  Under Criminal Justice Act 1993 (UK) c 36, s 52. 
126  Lady Hale DPSC, Lord Wilson and Lord Hodge agreed with Lord Toulson’s judgment, as did 
Lord Kerr, who also concurred separately (see below n 137 and accompanying text). 
127  Patel [2016] 3 WLR 399, 433 [120]. 
128  Ibid. See also Andrew Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Contract (Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 221–30. 
129  Patel [2016] 3 WLR 399, 432 [114]. 
130  Ibid 431 [113]. 
131  Ibid. 
132  Ibid. 
133  Ibid 431 [114]. 
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proposed by the commission ‘was not seen to be “a pressing priority for government” 
(a phrase familiar to the Commission)’.134  
 
Lord Kerr issued a separate concurrence, particularly seeking to defend Lord 
Toulson’s approach from the criticisms of the minority: ‘Lord Toulson JSC’s 
judgment outlines a structured approach to a hitherto intractable problem. It is an 
approach, moreover, which, if properly applied, will promote, rather than detract 
from, consistency in the law’.135 Although the Justices all agreed as to the outcome of 
the appeal, Lord Kerr preferred Lord Toulson’s approach as Lord Sumption’s 
approach was ‘a much more adventitious and less satisfactory route to the proper 
disposal of the case’136 than the assessment of factors approach. Finally, Lord Kerr 
particularly scrutinised Lord Sumption’s tracing of the recent history of the defence 
and argued that Apotex did not fully represent the law, and that Hounga was not 
reconcilable with it.137  
 
The final Justice to concur with Lord Toulson was Lord Neuberger PSC. His Lordship 
considered carefully the development of the law and on the facts held that the 
principle of restitution should apply where there was no valid contract pursuant to 
which a payment was made. On the broader question of the proper test in cases of 
illegality, Lord Neuberger, despite confessing some doubts,138 concluded that the 
structured approach ‘provides as reliable and helpful guidance as it is possible to give 
in this difficult field’.139 
 
2 The Judgments of Lords Mance and Clarke 
 
Three Justices concurred in the outcome but for very different reasons from the 
majority, and in terms which are tantamount to dissents: Lords Mance, Clarke and 
Sumption. Lord Mance accepted that the law of illegality and Tinsley required 
review,140 but favoured an approach that simply put the parties back in the position 
that they would have been in if there had been no illegal contract.141 In particular, 
Lord Mance viewed it as both unnecessary for the appeal, and undesirable that ‘the 
law of illegality should be generally rewritten’.142 Lord Clarke agreed with both Lords 
Mance and Sumption: he recognised that ‘common law principles develop from time 
to time’,143 but viewed the majority approach as inappropriate given the agreement as 
to the resolution of the appeal.144 
 
                                                 
134  Ibid. 
135  Ibid 434 [123]. 
136  Ibid 435 [128]. 
137  Ibid 435–38 [130]–[140]. 
138  Ibid 446 [175]. 
139  Ibid 446 [174]. Lord Neuberger concluded by observing at 448 [186]:  
Finally, I should say that, although my analysis may be slightly different from that of Lord Toulson 
JSC, I do not think that there is any significant difference between us in practice. I agree with his 
framework for arriving at an outcome, but I also consider that there is a prima facie outcome, 
namely restitution in integrum. 
140  Ibid 448 [187]. 
141  Ibid 452 [198]. 
142  Ibid 454 [204]. His Lordship also refers to the majority ‘tearing up the existing law and starting 
again’: at 455 [208]. 
143  Ibid 458 [220]. 
144  Ibid 459 [222]–[223]. 
 18 
 
3 Lord Sumption’s Judgment 
 
Lord Sumption’s judgment, as noted, frames the debate as between those who favour 
the application of clear rules and those who favour more flexibility. His Lordship’s 
concern is that, while the flexibility of the common law provides advantages over 
codified systems, 
 
there is a price to be paid for this advantage in terms of certainty and accessibility to 
those who are not professional lawyers. The equities of a particular case are important. 
But there are pragmatic limits to what law can achieve without becoming arbitrary, 
incoherent and unpredictable even to the best advised citizen, and without inviting 
unforeseen and undesirable collateral consequences.145 
 
His Lordship would have refined the operation of Tinsley, but still held that ‘the 
reliance test accords with principle’,146 because it prevents the derivation of legal 
rights from illegal acts, ensures a relevant causal link, and prevents the scope of the 
illegality defence being unduly broad.147 By contrast, ‘[e]very alternative test which 
has been proposed would widen the application of the defence as well as render its 
application more uncertain’.148 Allowing Mr Patel’s claim here, for Lord Sumption, 
did not offend against the law on illegality: rather, it ‘merely recognises the 
ineffectiveness of the transaction and gives effect to the ordinary legal consequences 
of that state of affairs’.149 Lord Sumption viewed the majority’s approach as changing 
the law on terms and in circumstances which did not justify such a development: 
 
We are entitled to change the law, but if we do that we should do it openly, 
acknowledging what we are doing and assessing the consequences, including the 
indirect consequences, so far as we can foresee them. In my opinion, it would be wrong 
to transform the policy factors which have gone into the development of the current 
rules, into factors influencing an essentially discretionary decision about whether those 
rules should be applied.150 
 
Instead, the majority was introducing ‘revolutionary change in hitherto accepted legal 
principle’.151 
 
In his ‘Reflections on the Law of Illegality’ article, Lord Sumption suspected ‘that the 
main reason why English law has got itself into this mess has been a distaste for the 
consequences of applying its own rules’.152 He recognised that again in Patel, but 
concluded that ‘would be doing no service to the coherent development of the law if 
we simply substituted a new mess for the old one’.153 
 
It is not of course inconsistent for Lord Sumption to now prefer what he thinks of as a 
rule-based approach, for at least two reasons. First, as we have seen, his Lordship has 
                                                 
145  Ibid 460 [226]. 
146  Ibid 465 [239]. 
147  Ibid. 
148  Ibid. 
149  Ibid 469 [250]. 
150  Ibid 473 [261] (sic). 
151  Ibid 474 [264]. 
152  Lord Sumption, ‘Reflections on the Law of Illegality’, above n 72, 2. 
153  Patel [2016] 3 WLR 399, 475 [265]. 
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said that there is a difference between speaking in and out of court. Second, Lord 
Sumption’s principal concern is about whether it is appropriate for the judiciary to 
develop the law in this way. In his Lordship’s view, it is one thing for Parliament (as 
advised by the Law Commission) to confer a discretion on the courts, it is quite 
another for the courts to arrogate it to themselves. The recent illegality cases thus 
serve as a valuable example of Lord Sumption’s strong views on particular topics and 
his broader vision of the limits of the judicial role.  
 
VI THE TORT OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 
 
Lord Sumption’s dissenting judgment in Willers(No 1) is instructive because his 
Lordship took the opportunity to reaffirm his approach to precedent as well as again 
reaffirming his own approach in a previous judgment. In this, the ‘most closely 
contested case’ of 2016,154 a majority of the Justices held that the tort of malicious 
prosecution of civil proceedings existed. A panel of nine Justices was convened in 
order to resolve a tension between a decision of the House of Lords in Gregory v 
Portsmouth City Council (‘Gregory’)155 and that of the Privy Council in Crawford 
Adjusters v Sagicor General Insurance (Cayman) Ltd (‘Crawford’).156  
 
Privy Council decisions do not generally have binding authority on the courts in 
England and Wales. Thus, Lord Sumption’s persistence on the limits of the tort should 
be understood in the context that Crawford should not be taken to have settled the 
English law. A final preliminary point is that the Supreme Court answered a wider 
question about the status of Privy Council decisions in English law in the unanimous 
decision in Willers v Joyce (No 2).157 The Court held that the 
 
[Privy Council], which normally consists of the same judges as the Supreme Court, 
should, when applying English law, be capable of departing from an earlier decision 
of the Supreme Court or House of Lords to the same extent and with the same effect 
as the Supreme Court.158 
 
The short judgment for the Court in Willers (No 2)was delivered by Lord Neuberger, 
with the agreement of all of the Justices (including Lord Sumption, who also 
expressly agreed with it in Willers (No 1)).159 
 
A Background 
 
The tort of malicious prosecution is available to a claimant who suffers damage as the 
result of the institution of proceedings against her, where those proceedings are 
determined in her favour and were brought without reasonable and probable cause and 
where the defendant was motivated by malice.160 In Gregory, the House of Lords held 
                                                 
154  Dickson, ‘Supreme Justice’, above n 81, 21. 
155  [2000] 1 AC 419. 
156  [2014] AC 366. 
157  [2016] 3 WLR 534; See Peter Mirfield, ‘A Novel Theory of Privy Council Precedent’ (2017) 
133 Law Quarterly Review 1.  
158  Willers v Joyce [No 2] [2016] 3 WLR, 542 [21]. 
159  Willers (No 1) [2016] 3 WLR 477, 532 [180]. 
160  See generally Michael A Jones et al (eds), Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, (Sweet & Maxwell, 21st 
ed, 2014) 1182–3; Michael A Jones et al (eds), Clerk & Lindsell on Torts: Second Supplement to 
the Twenty-First Edition, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) 146. See also Savile v Roberts (1698) 1 Ld 
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that the availability of the tort was generally limited to the prosecution of criminal 
proceedings, subject to some exceptions, such as the malicious bringing of ex parte 
proceedings and of a winding-up petition.161 The Law Lords in particular rejected the 
argument that disciplinary proceedings should be within the scope of the tort of 
malicious prosecution. In reaching that view, Lord Steyn had noted that there was a 
‘stronger case’ for extending the tort to civil proceedings than for disciplinary ones 
but concluded, in obiter, that ‘for essentially practical reasons [he was] not persuaded 
that the general extension of the tort to civil proceedings has been shown to be 
necessary if one takes into account the protection afforded by other related torts’.162 
 
In 2013, however, the Privy Council revisited the question in Crawford. The case 
concerned a claim by a Mr Paterson, a loss adjuster who had been the victim of a 
campaign by an employee of the defendant insurers to ‘destroy him professionally’.163 
Prompted by their employee, the insurers had issued proceedings in fraud and 
conspiracy against Paterson and the builders, which it later discontinued.  
 
The Board, by a majority, held that the tort could, and should, extend to civil 
proceedings. Each of the five Justices gave a judgment.164 The leading judgment was 
given by Lord Wilson, who held that since ‘a distinctive feature of the tort is that the 
defendant has abused the coercive powers of the state, it applies as much to civil as to 
criminal proceedings’.165 Lord Wilson held that, even after Gregory, it was still open 
to the Privy Council to recognise that malicious prosecution could apply to civil 
proceedings. He did so on the basis that ‘no other tort is capable of extension so as to 
address the injustice of the present case’,166 whereas Lord Steyn’s reservation had 
been predicated on the basis that ‘other related torts’ could afford protection.167 Mr 
Paterson’s case, in Lord Wilson’s view, was a ‘monument’ for the damage that can be 
wrought by malicious instigation of civil proceedings.168 The target of the tort was an 
‘action … taken for reasons disassociated with the professed purpose of the 
proceedings’.169 Lady Hale and Lord Kerr concurred with Lord Wilson. 
 
For Lords Sumption and Neuberger, on the other hand, it was impermissible to regard 
Gregory as leaving open the possible extension of the malicious prosecution tort. This 
is partly attributable to a difference of opinion over the status of Lord Steyn’s 
comments. Lord Sumption accepted that they were strictly ‘obiter’, but asserted that 
                                                                                                                                            
Raym 374; 91 ER 1147. As Lord Mance points out in Willers v Joyce [2016] 3 WLR 477, 508 
[98], there are inconsistencies between the different reports of the case. See also Lord Reed: at 
532 [183]. 
161  Gregory [2000] 1 AC 419. See also Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre (1883) 11 
QBD 674. 
162  Gregory [2000] 1 AC 419, 432. 
163  Crawford [2014] AC 366, 380 [14] (Lord Wilson). The affair is succinctly summarised by Lord 
Kerr JSC at 404 [91]. 
164  Lord Mance noted in Willers (No 1) [2016] 3 WLR 477 that the ‘question received intense and 
helpful consideration in no less than five judgments given by the five members of the court’: at 
506 [92]. 
165  Crawford [2014] AC 366, 400 [78]. Baroness Hale spoke of ‘intentionally abusing the legal 
system … bringing claims which you know to be bad’: at 404 [89]. 
166  Ibid 386 [39]. 
167  Gregory [2000] 1 AC 419, 432. Lord Kerr placed weight on this point: Crawford [2014] AC 
366, 410 [117]–[118]. 
168  Crawford [2014] AC 366, 392 [61]. 
169  Ibid 411 [119] (Lord Kerr JSC).  
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‘there are dicta and dicta. The application of the tort to the abuse of civil proceedings 
was decided in Gregory because it was important to settle it’.170 Their Lordships also 
disagreed over the history of the tort and as to whether the case law had formally 
recognised a distinction between civil and criminal proceedings. In Crawford, Lord 
Sumption viewed control mechanisms in the tort as crucial, but as largely questions of 
policy: ‘Defining the legal elements of a tort and the legal limitations on its ambit will 
commonly involve a large element of policy which may conflict with the simple 
principle that for every injustice there should be remedy at law’.171  
 
B The Facts in Willers (No 1) 
 
Willers (No 1) was an expedited appeal from the High Court,172 because of the direct 
conflict between the House of Lords in Gregory and that of the Privy Council in 
Crawford. The claimant Mr Willers was the ‘right hand man’173 to a Mr Gubay, a 
successful businessman (Mr Gubay died while the case was being appealed to the 
UKSC and so his executors, including Mr Joyce, continued to defend the claim on 
behalf of his estate). Mr Gubay dismissed Mr Willers after over 20 years of service. 
One of Mr Gubay’s companies was Langstone Leisure, and Mr Willers was a director 
of it. Langstone had initiated but then abandoned (on Mr Gubay’s instructions) a 
claim for wrongful trading against another company, Aqua Design and Play, in 2009. 
A year after his dismissal, Langstone sued Mr Willers for various alleged breaches in 
respect of the abandoned litigation. Mr Willers defended the claim on the basis that 
Mr Gubay had directed him in the pursuit of the claim against Aqua. Two weeks 
before trial of the claim against Mr Willers and Langstone discontinued their action, 
and were ordered to pay Mr Willers’ costs. Mr Willers then sought to sue in malicious 
prosecution, claiming damage to his reputation, loss of earnings and various other 
costs: it was accepted that, if the tort did extend to the prosecution of civil 
proceedings, then the other ingredients of the claim were made out. However, Mr 
Gubay’s executors argued that, on the authority of Gregory, there was no cause of 
action on English law. 
 
The nine Justice panel in Willers (No 1) included all five members of the Board from 
Crawford, who each maintained their previous positions on the scope of the tort. They 
were joined by four further Justices, who divided evenly on the appeal, with the result 
that there was a 5:4 split in favour of the tort extending to the prosecution of civil 
proceedings.  
 
C Lord Toulson’s Leading Judgment and the Majority 
 
The majority comprised Lady Hale, Lords Kerr, Clarke, Wilson and Toulson. As he 
had in Patel, Lord Toulson gave the leading judgment, while Lord Clarke concurred 
separately. (It is of note that none of the three Justices who had been in the majority in 
Crawford repeated themselves). For the majority, it was significant that Lord Steyn’s 
doubts in Gregory as to whether the tort should extend to the prosecution of civil 
proceedings were obiter and briefly stated.174 Lord Toulson viewed the legal history 
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as being ‘capable of more than one respectable interpretation’,175 and in any case the 
Court’s decision ‘should not depend on which side has the better argument on a 
controversial question about the scope of the law some centuries ago’.176 
 
Lord Toulson said that the ‘common law is prized for its combination of principle and 
pragmatism’:177 
 
The case law on the tort of malicious prosecution is in point. It shows how the courts 
have fashioned the tort to do justice in various situations in which a person has suffered 
injury in consequence of the malicious use of legal process without any reasonable 
basis.178 
  
His Lordship proceeded to analyse the question in terms of both policy and principle: 
the starting point was that the intuitive appeal to justice of the claimant’s case was 
‘both obvious and compelling’.179 It therefore fell to be determined whether there 
were countervailing considerations that should limit the scope of the tort to existing 
authority. In his judgment, Lord Toulson patiently and meticulously addressed the 
range of policy factors180 identified by the minority and held that none is of sufficient 
weight to deny the availability of the tort. Lord Clarke supported Lord Toulson’s 
historical analysis: as a former commercial lawyer, Lord Clarke also particularly 
focused on the relevance of the jurisprudence on arrest of ships,181 as a parallel 
example of a tort involving the subversion of legal processes to the detriment of the 
instant claimant. 
 
D The Dissentients 
 
Lords Neuberger, Mance, Sumption and Reed dissented. The judgments are marked 
by their strong wording, and by a conviction that the recognition of the tort of 
malicious prosecution of civil proceedings would be a bold departure from the 
‘heavily circumscribed’182 instances of exceptional liability previously established. 
 
In his dissent, Lord Mance subjected the case to detailed historical analysis,183 but also 
associated himself with the dissent of Lord Sumption in Crawford.184 His Lordship 
conceded that, ‘[v]iewed in isolation, the assumed facts of this case make it attractive 
                                                 
175 Ibid 485 [16]. See also Lord Neuberger at 526 [150], although his Lordship was persuaded by 
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to think that the appellant should have a legal remedy’,185 but thought there were valid 
reasons why he should not. In addition to arguments such as the uncertainty as to the 
nature of the heads of damage available,186 Lord Mance argued that there were further 
reasons of principle and policy for the ‘apparent dearth of authority’ to support the 
existence of a generalised tort prior to Crawford.187 His reasoning was based on both 
history and the present, with a notable turn of phrase: 
 
Not only does [the majority approach] ignore the teaching of history, showing courts 
studiously avoiding any such parallel. It also ignores the fact that, in an era when 
private prosecutions have largely disappeared, the tort of malicious prosecution of 
criminal proceedings is virtually extinct. To create a tort of malicious prosecution of 
civil proceedings might in these circumstances be thought to come close to 
necromancy.188 
 
Lord Neuberger also dissented, noting that the Justices had ‘been given a fuller 
analysis of the history and implications of this tort than we had in the Judicial 
Committee’.189 Lord Reed agreed with Lords Mance and Neuberger.  
 
Lord Sumption’s dissent again displays his caution and scepticism when it comes to 
judicial innovation. It is a brief judgment of eight paragraphs: his Lordship limited 
himself since he had ‘expressed my reasons at length in [Crawford], and I entirely 
agree with the judgments of Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance in this one’.190 Even 
with its brevity, however, the judgment is marked by the force of its historical 
conviction and its concern for the limits of (and on) judicial decision-making in a 
private law context. It is Lord Sumption’s view that the history of the principle is 
clear. The ‘tort of general application … has never once been successfully invoked in 
the period of some five centuries during which the question has arisen’.191 That being 
the case, the tort was ‘novel’: 
 
Novelty as such is of course no bar to the recognition of a rule of law. But in a system 
of judge-made customary law, judges have always accepted limitations on their 
ability to recognise new bases of non-consensual liability.192 
 
Lord Sumption noted two particular limitations, which he has identified -  along with, 
so his Lordship says judges, generally -as criteriaapplicable to this (and any) proposed 
development of the law. The first is a requirement of coherence, that ‘the development 
must be consistent with other, cognate principles of law, whether statutory or judge-
made’.193 Lord Sumption did not regard the generalised tort as coherent because it 
would cut across other areas of liability and immunities. The second is that any 
‘proposed development of the law should be warranted by current values and current 
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social conditions’, for ‘[u]nless the law is to be reinvented on a case by case basis, 
something must generally have changed to make appropriate that which was 
previously rejected’.194 Lord Sumption viewed the modern powers of the courts to 
deal with abuse of procedures through case management powers as reinforcing, rather 
than undermining, the policy reasons against the generalised tort. Again then, in this 
brief judgment, we find various features of Lord Sumption’s judicial style and 
philosophy: an insistence on historical accuracy, a reaffirmation of previous views, 
and concern over the appropriateness of judicial innovation. The parallel with Patel is 
also clear: each time, the argument is then presented in a manner which frames the 
debate as being between a responsible, self-conscious respect for the existing law on 
Lord Sumption’s side, and a more creative, ‘case by case’ approach on the other. 
 
VII WIDER THEMES 
 
The two case studies considered so far have shown that Lord Sumption is conscious 
of what he sees as the appropriate limits of the judicial role. In both Patel and Willers 
(No 1), Lord Sumption is cautious with respect to the judicial evolution of the law, 
and differs from some of his colleagues as to when a change can be regarded as 
incremental. In this Part, I identify wider themes in Lord Sumption’s judicial 
catalogue, beginning with two rhetorical features of Lord Sumption’s approach to 
recent authority. 
 
A Considering Recent Precedent 
 
1 Never or Ever? 
 
I have argued above that Lord Sumption’s reasoning in both Patel and Willers (No 1) 
frames the argument as having precedent on his side, and exhibits caution in the 
development of the law. Yet in R v Taylor (‘Taylor’),195 Lord Sumption was less 
precise in his phrasing. The appellant was charged with aggravated vehicle taking in 
breach of section 12A of the Theft Act 1968 (UK) c 60.196 He had taken a truck and 
been involved in an accident in which a scooter driver was killed. There was no 
evidence to show that he was at fault in the manner of his driving. The argument in 
Taylor was over the nature of the requisite element of fault: whether fault in respect of 
the driving of the vehicle had to be shown, or if the fault in the unauthorised taking of 
the vehicle sufficed.  
 
In the 2013 case of R v Hughes (‘Hughes’),197 the UKSC held that causative fault in 
the defendant’s control of the vehicle was necessary as part of the offence causing 
death of another while driving uninsured, contrary to section 3ZB of the Road Traffic 
Act 1988 (UK) c 52. The question in Taylor was whether Hughes also applied to a 
charge under section 12A of the Theft Act 1968 (UK) c 60. There was a Court of 
Appeal authority that no fault element was required under section 12A,198 the 
correctness of which was left open by the Justices in Hughes.199 
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In Taylor, the Crown’s ‘primary case’200 was that Hughes should be departed from 
under the Practice Statement on the basis that the Crown had in that case conceded 
that the fault (or absence) could in some circumstances be relevant. Lord Sumption 
rejected the contention that this affected the result: it was ‘clear … that the concession 
did not displace the need for argument or analysis. It simply exposed the weakness of 
the Crown’s case’.201 His Lordship continued: 
 
In those circumstances, the only basis on which it could be right to depart from the 
decision now is that the court as presently constituted takes a different view. A mere 
difference of opinion can rarely justify departing from an earlier decision of this court. I 
can see nothing in the present case which could justify our taking such a course, and I 
would decline to do so.202 
 
His Lordship then held that the reasoning in Hughes could not be distinguished,203 but 
that even if it could, the ‘relevant fault is the fault in the driving which is necessary to 
establish the causal connection between the driving and the accident’.204 The 
defendant’s appeal was therefore allowed. 
 
What is key to note for present purposes, however, is Lord Sumption’s phrasing of 
this ‘mere difference of opinion’ constraint on a subsequent court: ‘A mere difference 
of opinion can rarely justify departing from an earlier decision of this court’.205 That 
use of ‘rarely’ may be significant, because it could indicate a change from the 
established practice that a mere difference of opinion can never justify a departure 
from precedent to that it can rarely do so. I do not wish to overplay this point – in 
Taylor itself the Court reaffirmed the existing precedent, and it is possible that one 
may focus unduly on a Justice’s choice of adverb. The other six Justices206 in Taylor 
all agreed with Lord Sumption’s judgment. Given that we have seen Lord Sumption is 
committed to constraints of reasoning with precedent, it is surprising that his Lordship 
should express himself without his typical precision. 
 
2 The Individual and the Court 
 
Lord Sumption’s judicial reticence can also be seen in Société Coopérative de 
Production Seafrance SA v Competition and Markets Authority,207 where his 
Lordship reaffirmed that ‘caution … is required before an appellate court can be 
justified in overturning the economic judgments of an expert tribunal’.208 
Furthermore, his Lordship prefaced that dictum  with the formulaic phrase  ‘this 
court has recently emphasised the caution…’, referring to a case in which Lord 
Sumption had himself given the judgment.209 His Lordship did a similar thing in the 
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illegality case of Bilta, when discussing Apotex.210 It is indeed true that a dictum 
from a member of a unanimous court has the authority of the court, but this 
noticeable technique of referring to ‘this Court’ having held or emphasised 
something when referring to one of his Lordship’s own judgments is a conscious 
stylistic choice to lend force to the point which Lord Sumption supports. This trait is 
also a function of the trend towards single judgments,211 and the teamwork involved 
in discussion, circulation and revision of judgments.212 
 
B Affirmation of Doctrine 
 
Several of the other recent decisions in which Lord Sumption took the lead have 
involved the confirmation of general principles, when the UKSC has nonetheless been 
willing to entertain a challenge to existing authority by hearing the relevant appeal. As 
is Lord Sumption’s wont, these judgments demonstrate a rigorous and historically 
detailed approach born of considerable learning.213 
 
Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi (‘Cavendish’)214 saw, on two appeals, the 
UKSC consider the common law rule that contractual penalty clauses are not 
enforceable. Seven Justices sat on the appeal, since the Court was invited to re-
examine a long-established rule of the law of contract. One of the appeals concerned a 
commercial arrangement to see a controlling stake in an advertising company that the 
defendant had founded. The defendant agreed to a non-compete clause, with provision 
for financial consequences and the loss of rights to further payment in the event of a 
breach of the clause. The other appeal concerned an attempt by the claimant to 
enforce a fine of £85 after the defendant exceeded the permitted two hours stay in a 
privately owned car park. Lords Neuberger and Sumption issued the joint lead 
judgment, reaffirming the existence and operation of the penalty rule.215 The Supreme 
Court criticised the reasoning of the High Court of Australia in Andrews v Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd,216 as representing ‘a radical departure from the 
previous understanding of the law’,217 going so far as to say that ‘although the 
reasoning in the Andrews case was entirely historical, it is not in fact consistent with 
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the equitable rule as it developed historically’.218 Lords Neuberger and Sumption said 
further interference with freedom of contract ought not to be extended ‘at least by 
judicial, as opposed to legislative, decision-making’.219 Here we again see the views 
of Lord Sumption as to the proper limits of judicial development of the law.220 
 
A relatively rare example of all five UKSC Justices delivering separate judgements221 
is Versloot Dredging BV v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicherung AG (‘Versloot’).222 
The Justices considered what constitutes a fraudulent claim in the context of insurance 
contracts. A majority of the Court, led by Lord Sumption, held that where a collateral 
lie was irrelevant to the recoverability of the claim, it did not bar recovery. Lord 
Sumption argued for caution, on the basis that the court could not  
 
assess empirically the wider behavioural consequences of legal rules. The formation of 
legal policy in this as in other areas depends mainly on the vindication of collective 
moral values and on judicial instincts about the motivation of rational beings, not on the 
scientific anthropology of fraud or underwriting. As applied to dishonestly exaggerated 
claims, the fraudulent claims rule is well established …223 
 
Lord Mance dissented, partly in defence of one of his own decisions from when he 
was in the Court of Appeal.224 Further, though, Lord Mance insisted that in the UKSC 
‘we are of course free to reconsider prior authority at a lower level, although we 
should no doubt be reluctant to upset the instincts of previous courts addressing an 
issue over the past century’.225 In Lord Mance’s view, then, Versloot stands as an 
example of where Lord Sumption was willing to overrule a precedent (albeit of a 
lower court) and go against the history of the matter in developing the law. 
 
C Raising New Arguments 
 
As counsel, Lord Sumption admitted that, when appearing before the Lords or 
Supreme Court, he had ‘found myself quite often reformulating the way that the issue 
is argued, not fundamentally, it’s not jettisoning the grounds below, but trying to 
suggest a completely different approach to the problem’.226 Now as a Justice of the 
Supreme Court, there are examples of that advocate’s tendency in Lord Sumption’s 
judging. However, this willingness to reframe arguments is arguably at odds with the 
pattern of judicious and judicial caution that we have so far seen. It is certainly a 
manifestation of Lord Sumption’s judicial individuality. 
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In Angove’s Pty Ltd v Bailey (‘Bailey’),227 Lord Sumption considered when, if ever, 
an agent’s authority was irrevocable. Having concluded that the principal had 
terminated the agent’s authority in the relevant case, it was ‘strictly speaking 
unnecessary’228 to answer a second question relating to the scope of constructive 
trusts. However, Lord Sumption considered it in obiter dicta, because ‘the point is of 
some general importance and has been fully argued before us’.229 In his obiter 
analysis, Lord Sumption disapproved of Neste Oy v Lloyd’s Bank Plc (‘Neste Oy’),230 
a long-standing decision of Bingham J, for being insufficiently precise orcertain.231 
His Lordship noted that an alternative justification for Bingham J’s decision rested on 
mistake.232 But his Lordship declined to address that point because it did not arise on 
the appeal.233 And yet, having decided to consider the status of Neste Oy when it was 
not necessary to do so, it would have been desirable to address the case in the round, 
rather than leaving its status in doubt. 
 
Lord Sumption has come in for some criticism on occasion for his approach to 
argument. Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas plc (‘Eclairs’),234 saw Lord Sumption 
consider the proper purposes rule in respect of the exercise of fiduciary powers by 
company directors. The case involved an ‘alleged “corporate raid”’, and an attempt by 
the target company’s directors to restrict the voting rights of the raiders at the annual 
general meeting.235 Lord Sumption traces the history of the rule.236 His Lordship 
decided that the approach to causation should be that if the power would not have 
been exercised but for the presence of the improper purpose, it should be exercised. 
Such a view would be ‘consistent with the rationale of the proper purpose rule … 
[and] corresponds to the view which courts of equity have always taken about the 
exercise of powers of appointment by trustees’.237 Lord Mance expressed reservations 
with respect to Lord Sumption’s approach, noting that the argument was not 
‘advanced by any party during the oral hearing before the Supreme Court’:238  
 
although I have sympathy with Lord Sumption’s view that ‘but for’ causation offers a 
single, simple test, which it might be possible or even preferable to substitute for 
references to the principal or primary purpose, I am not persuaded that we can or 
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should safely undertake what all parties consider would be ‘a new development’ of 
company law, without having heard argument.239 
 
Lord Clarke agreed that ‘not all the points were the subject of full argument and 
consideration below’.240 
 
The UKSC considered the response of insurance policies to exceptional causation 
tests in International Energy Group (Ltd) v Zurich Insurance plc UK Branch.241 The 
hearing began with five Justices, but was re-argued before a panel of seven in light of 
points made in argument. When judgments were delivered, there was a 4:3 split 
between the Justices, with Lord Mance, for the majority, viewing Lord Sumption’s 
dissent242 as challenging a repeated concession by all of the parties as to the extent of 
an insurer’s liability.243  
 
In the Privy Council, Lord Sumption has held that points should be determined more 
narrowly,244 or at least differently, from either his judicial colleagues or counsel 
before him. In Arorangi Timberland Limited v Minister of the Cook Islands National 
Superannuation Fund,245 the Privy Council concluded that section 53 of the Cook 
Islands National Superannuation Act 2000 (Cook Islands) as enacted, was 
discriminatory against migrant workers. Lord Sumption partially dissented on this 
point, noting that the ‘claimants object[ed to the scheme] on two grounds which, 
although elided in argument and in the majority’s analysis, are actually distinct’.246 
His Lordship’s partial dissent seems to view the majority’s view as resting on a 
disagreement with the policy over loss of rights under the pension scheme, but ‘the 
way in which different societies resolve such dilemmas involves legitimate policy 
choices’.247  
 
In the 2017 UKSC decision of Akers v Samba Financial Group,248 a case concerning 
purported trusts, private international law and the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) c 45, 
Lord Sumption concurred, but took issue with how counsel on both sides had sought 
to frame the case: 
 
The real issues raised by this argument have been obscured by the narrow basis on 
which it was presented in the courts below … This was unfortunate, for it meant that 
the oral argument proceeded on an artificial basis … The omission was ultimately made 
good after the conclusion of argument by the service of written submissions at the 
request of the court. This means that it is possible for us to address the issue on a rather 
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broader basis of principle than the courts below. It also means that a number of the 
issues which featured in argument below can be seen not to arise.249 
 
Taken together, these instances of Lord Sumption’s willingness to adopt either much 
narrower or much wider analyses of cases before the Court than his colleagues (or 
counsel) indicate two points. Lord Sumption feels the strong temptation to issue his 
own reasons, which he has deprecated elsewhere,250 and there is also some tension in 
respect of his Lordship’s general support for a restrained approach to judging.  
 
VIII RHETORIC IN AND OUT OF COURT 
 
I noted above Lord Sumption’s warning about reading everything he says in and out 
of the court and reading anything into it. The full quote is as follows: 
 
there is no point in comparing my lectures with my judgments on these issues and 
finding inconsistencies between them. Of course they are inconsistent. As a judge, I am 
not there to expound my own opinion. My job is to say what I think the law is. By 
comparison, in a public lecture, I am my own master. I can allow myself the luxury of 
expressing approval or dismay about the current state of the law. You might wonder 
whether, in the highest court of the land, which is bound by no precedent even of its 
own, there is any difference between my own opinion and my exposition of the law. I 
have to tell you that there is and that it matters. The personal opinions of the judges in 
the Supreme Court are only one element in the complex process of decision-making, 
and not necessarily the most important one.251 
  
I am not arguing here that Lord Sumption’s speeches, writings and judgments are 
inconsistent; rather that in some respects they are strikingly consistent, to the point of 
using the same language. We saw in Part V the significance of his Lordship’s 
‘Reflections’ lecture in his thinking on the law of illegality.252 Further examples show 
that there is more to be learned from Lord Sumption’s observations. 
 
An example from public law is Nicklinson,253 which concerned prosecutorial 
discretion in relation to assisted suicide. The Supreme Court declined to make a 
declaration of incompatibility as to the consistency of the current law of England and 
Wales with the European Convention on Human Rights.254 Lord Sumption dissented 
as to whether the Supreme Court should have competence to make a declaration of 
compatibility at all, considering that it went to the ‘proper constitutional function of 
the courts as opposed to Parliament’.255 In his Lordship’s assessment, the applicable 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights made clear that it was within 
the State’s margin of appreciation: ‘the issue is an inherently legislative issue for 
Parliament, as the representative body in our constitution, to decide’.256 But what is 
particularly of note is that Lord Sumption’s opinion in Nicklinson draws on his views 
in his speeches. He goes as far as using the same examples. Thus, Lord Sumption 
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made the point that the courts should not allow parties to win battles on moral and 
political judgements which they have lost in Parliament,257 referring to observations 
by Lord Bingham in R (Countryside Alliance) v A-G258 and Lord Hope in AXA 
General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate.259 The same point, and quotes, are made in a 
paragraph of his FA Mann Lecture.260 In Nicklinson, his Lordship referred to the 
difficulty of courts engaging with ‘polycentric problems’261 which may involve more 
interested parties than those before the court, as he did in his ‘Limits of Law’ 
lecture.262 
 
Lord Sumption has also used the same vivid metaphors in his extra-curial speeches. In 
his lecture ‘The Historian as Judge’, he pointed to his concerns in respect of the 
majority’s approach in Willers (No 1): ‘Even the Supreme Court cannot approach the 
law of tort as if Britain were an uninhabited island awaiting its lawgiver, instead of a 
complex society shaped by a long past’.263 
 
His Lordship had, in Patel, made exactly the same analogy in the context of the 
defence of illegality: 
 
The common law is not an uninhabited island on which judges are at liberty to plant 
whatever suits their personal tastes. It is a body of instincts and principles which, 
barring some radical change in the values of our society, is developed organically, 
building on what was there before.264 
 
This island metaphor is not quite the same as criticisms of discretion more broadly in 
terms of ‘palm tree justice’, for example, as Dillon LJ once observed: ‘the court does 
not as yet sit, as under a palm tree, to exercise a general discretion to do what the man 
in the street, on a general overview of the case, might regard as fair’.265 There the 
island is clearly already inhabited by the judges and subjects, but the judges do not 
regard themselves as bound by principle. On Lord Sumption’s imagined island, the 
concern is instead a judge showing insufficient regard for history, doctrine and 
precedent, which, as we have seen, are part of the fabric of Lord Sumption’s 
jurisprudence. 
 
To be clear, my point here is not that judges should not give extra judicial speeches, 
and I am mindful of recent controversies. At the time of the initial submission of this 
article, there was extensive media attention focused on the Justices of the UKSC and 
their judgments in and out of the Court, in advance of the hearing in the Miller appeal 
concerning the process for the UK leaving the European Union.266 The coverage 
included criticism of a constitutional law lecture by Lady Hale in Malaysia267 the 
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month before the hearing in Miller, which some perceived to be speculating about the 
forthcoming arguments. The Court published a response stating that ‘it is entirely 
proper for serving judges to set out the arguments in high profile cases to help public 
understanding of the legal issues, as long as it is done in an even-handed way’.268 
Lord Mance withdrew from delivering the Thomas More Lecture (which is always on 
a European topic) at Lincoln’s Inn the week before the hearing.269 Lord Neuberger 
PSC, on the first morning of the hearing in Miller, recorded that all parties had been 
asked whether they wished to ask for any Justice to recuse themselves: all parties 
stated that they had no objection to any of the 11 Justices sitting on the appeal.270 
 
It is a valuable service that the Justices should speak to students, universities and the 
wider public: as the editors of Lord Sumption and the Limits of Law observe, ‘the 
public conversation about the nature and limits of judicial power has long been 
enriched by the extra-judicial reflections of our leading judges’.271 The Supreme 
Court has its own policy on extra-curial activity in its Guide to Judicial Conduct,272 
which notes that Justices must bear in mind the risk of bias, but it also explicitly 
recognises the importance of Justices engaging, with the aim being ‘to enhance 
professional and public understanding of the issues and of the role of the Court’.273 
 
There is nothing necessarily remarkable about a judge relying on their own previous 
work. For example, Findlay Stark has recently pointed out that Lord Toulson drew 
upon an essay in an edited collection in his joint judgment with Lord Hughes in the 
joint enterprise decision in R v Jogee.274 In Twinsectra v Yardley,275 for example, Lord 
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Millett considered the proper theoretical basis of a Quistclose trust276 and came to the 
conclusion that he himself had been correct in a 1985 article analysing the issue.277 
Lord Millett concluded that ‘[as] Sherlock Holmes reminded Dr Watson, when you 
have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the 
truth’:278 in this case, the ‘improbable’ was that Lord Millett was still right. Lord 
Sumption is neither the first nor will he be the last to draw upon his judgments in his 
speeches or vice versa. 
 
With respect, though, it is difficult to heed Lord Sumption’s admonition that we ought 
not to compare his judgments and extra-curial speeches, if his Lordship espouses not 
just the same views, but even uses the same phrases and metaphors. At the very least, 
a Justice’s choice of topics for extra-curial lectures can tell us something about their 
legal interests or preoccupations: it is significant that Lord Sumption selected the law 
of illegality as his first such speech, and that is borne out by the saga of the cases 
considered in Part V above. Reading Lord Sumption’s corpus of jurisprudence 
together also enables us to identify him as a juridical279 conservative on the UKSC.  
 
IX CONCLUSIONS 
 
In a 2004 newspaper review of Richard Barber’s, The Holy Grail: Imagination and 
Belief,280 the historian Jonathan Sumption QC remarked that: ‘As a symbol of 
something unattainably good, the grail is a cumulative product of the imagination of 
different individuals at different times, continually reclothed and reinterpreted, but 
always representing the same challenging human aspiration’.281 
 
This article has sought to illustrate the challenges of judging as an individual on a 
collective apex court by focusing on the jurisprudence of one individual Justice. Some 
of those challenges are particularly exaggerated on the UKSC because of its 
adjudicative structures. I do not intend to understate the contributions of the other 
Justices in the relevant cases, but Lord Sumption’s peculiar position as a direct 
appointee from the Bar has also informed his distinctly individual approach. A 
barrister’s forensic skill in reformulating arguments is certainly apparent in the areas 
of law considered here: indeed, it is perhaps his Lordship’s disposition to do so while 
judging. And yet that creative capacity may be contrasted with Lord Sumption’s 
approach to precedent, and more broadly to settled principles of the law; his Lordship 
is clearly more cautiously conservative than some of his judicial colleagues (such as 
Lord Toulson, who led the majority in both Patel and Willers (No 1)). His Lordship’s 
approach to public law has provoked controversy and academic scrutiny;282 the 
analysis here has drawn attention to his Lordship’s contribution in the area of private 
law by using two key case studies, which I have argued are representative of wider 
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themes in his Lordship’s jurisprudence. We have also seen the entrenched trenchancy 
of Lord Sumption’s views on certain substantive areas of law. 
 
Lord Reed, who was appointed to the Court one month after his colleague Lord 
Sumption, has commented upon the nature of teamwork between the individuals on 
the Supreme Court: ‘It is a curious team because the value of the team depends on 
everybody using their own individual intelligence and their own experience and so 
forth and bringing all that to the party, but our working method is very 
collaborative’.283  
 
We have seen that Lord Sumption, though ‘individual’, is nonetheless able to bring 
colleagues with him in his analyses. Lord Sumption’s workload (which, as we have 
seen was amongst the highest on the court in the most recent full year) and intellectual 
ambition have made him arguably one of the most influential Justices on the UKSC 
(after the President and Deputy President). We have further noted his Lordship’s 
willingness to join in authorship of (and responsibility for) lead judgments, such as in 
Cavendish and Miller. Lord Sumption has emphasised (both in and out of court) that 
the common law is not an uninhabited island, but we might also note that, on the 
UKSC, no judge is an island; each is ‘a piece of the continent, a part of the main’,284 a 
member of a collegial and imaginative institution.  
 
In conclusion, we may view the common law as also being the ‘cumulative product of 
the imagination of different individuals at different times, continually reclothed and 
reinterpreted’,285 and that poses challenges for its coherent development. We have 
seen that the UKSC is a collective and collegial court, and yet the Justices are all 
individuals, who have got to think for themselves. Through his unusual career and his 
judicial record, Lord Sumption has proven himself to be a very different and very 
individual judge. 
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